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ot lndianapoli,; at Columblls Center 
Vol. 26 No.3 
A/tRust 1993 
Tlw; cast' study of Kleer 'W·lIld{}w.~, a firm which manu{adures dooril and whldo(1)s ttlr the 
recreational vehicles industry (:zr}.fll('.~ that the iI/flunK;' of the work Rrr:JUP can undo certain condi-
tions be harnessed by management in their attempts to control w(Jrh'r.~. Peer control exists when co-
workers se/'k to monitor and influence each other',q level of productivit),. Data were collected durmg 
three summers of dhnogra,ohic researeh. A compariso/l of thl' control .~ystem." utilized in tlu> produc-
tion, shipping, and receiulng df'partments at Kleer Wmdows reut·(LI.~ that peer control is likely to 
;;;tmllllate, tather than inhibit, producti[lity when tli-'O conditions eXl,~t, First, when u'orh:rs art' moti-
vated to monitor one another through an I:nterdependence of retJ.!ard - making the rewards of each 
worker dep,'ndent Ilpon th., effort and prvducti[)ity of all (;()-u:orkers (1..<; well as the eflort of the indi-
vidual worker (i_I'" thnJu}(h the USI;' (If (1 }(fVUp bonus syst.'m) -, peer contml that stimulates produc" 
tivity is increasingly likely to develop. TIw second condition nece.~S(1ry for pel'r contml is that u.mrkers 
{)e able to monitor eetch other thmugh an interdependence of task -- organizing work s!H'h that each 
worker is df'pencUnt UpO/l ({J-I.l-·orker,~ ji)r the s!lcce,~sflll compf,dion oftht'ir work tasks Ii. e., Sf'rial pro-
duction) - contributes to tiLl' f".~tahli.~hnl.('llt of P",'T nmlnl/. 
INTRODUCTION 
The influence of the informal work group as a source of worker resistance to 
management control strategies is well documented in both recent and classic sociologi-
cal research (Molstad 1988; Juravlch 1985; Halle 1984; Storey 1983; Hill 1981; 
Roethlisberger and Dickson 1956; Whyte 1955; Roy 19.'52; 1953; 19E,4; Mayo 1933). 
Management has adopted various strategies in the attempt to overcome the tendency 
of the informal work group to restrict productivity. Individualized piece rate systems 
have been used in the aUempt to motivate workers to increase production (Burawoy 
1979; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1956; Roy 1952; 1953; 1954). However, these at-
t.empts have had only limited success as normative standards for production quickly 
(levelop within the work is-roup. The ~~oup bonus system attempted in the Hawthorne 
studies also met with wor'k group restriction of production. These findings raise the is-
!-iue, is it possible for management to harness the influence of the infonnal work 
groups in the drive to increase productivity? If so, under what conditions is the infor-
mal work group likely to stimulate the productivity of its individual members? 
This ethnographic case study of Kleer Windows,l a firm which manufactures 
windows for truck caps, vans, recreational vehicles, and mobile homes as well as truck 
(:ap doors, afE,:rues that peer control is the most significant determinant of the produc-
tivity of individual work group members. Peer control occurs when work is organized 
in a fashion that encourages co-workers to monitor and influence each other's level of 
productivity. At Kleer Windows, peer control stimulated productivity in the production 
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departments and, to a lesser extent, in the shipping department. The objective of this 
research is to identify the conditions that led to this outcome, rather than the more 
common tendency for informal work groups to limit productivity. 
At its most basic level, there are at least three dimensions of control (Edwards 
1979; Hachen 1988). Control involves (1) the direction of work; (21 the evaluation and 
monitoring of the work task; and (31 a system of reward and punishment. At Kleer 
Windows co-workers set the pace of work, monitored and evaluated each other's work 
effort, and contributed to the direction ofwark. Workers who conformed to the group's 
nonns were positively sanctioned (i.e., through intragroup status gains), Those who 
failed to fulfill the expectations of co-workers were negatively sanctioned in a myriad 
of ways (i.e., taunting/name calling), In the production departments at Kleer, the 
informal work group stimulated the productivity of individual workers. In the 
shipping department, the informal work group operated to ensure a level of 
productivity within a peer defined range of acceptability. In the receiving department, 
the informal work group had minimal impact on member's productivity. Analysis of 
these findings suggests that not only can the influence of the informal work group be 
used to decrease productivity, it also can, given appropriate conditions, be used to 
stimulate group productivity. 
METHODOLOGY 
This research was conducted over three summers (1989 to 1991) of full-time 
employment at Kleer Windows, two summers on the second shift and one on the first 
shift. The decision to conduct ethnographic research at KIeer came after entering the 
field as a temporary employee. I observed the informal work group acting to limit pro-
ductivity of individuals in some cases, as my graduate training in sociology had led me 
to expect. However, I also observed the informal work group's influence in stimulating 
production, an effect I had not anticipated. I began taking systematic field notes, writ-
ing brief notes to myself concerning the day's events both during work and immedi-
ately after working hours as I sat in my car in the parking lot. Upon returning to my 
home, I wrote more elaborate field notes using the brief "reminders" to stimulate my 
recollection of events. I gathered any printed materials made available to employees 
concerning Kleer Windows, Inc. and often questioned co-workers regarding their un-
derstanding of policies and events at Kleer. Hypotheses and insights were developed 
in a process of analytic induction (see Strauss and Corbin 1990; Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Lindesmith 1948) over the three summers I was employed at Kleer and as I 
studied and attempted to synthesize the field notes during the remainder of the year. 
Hypotheses were developed and revised as the search for negative cases dictated. 
THE RESEARCH SETTING 
Kleer Windows employed approximately 500 people, about 65% were females, in 
a three plant operation in the midwestern US. The years 1989 through 1991 were rel-
atively lean years economically for people seeking low-skill, manufacturing jobs in this 
part of the country. Kleer's large size presented workers with relative job security at a 
time when many smaller manufacturing finns were laying ofT workers or closing down 
completely. For the many unskilled, poorly educated single mothers employed there, 
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Kleer was one of the high'2r paid jobs available to them. The base wage,:; for production 
line employees, who were predominately female, averaged nearly $6.00 per hour. 
When combined with production bonus earnings ($100-$200 per weeki, the wages 
were higher than those available in other low-skill manufacturing jo"bs available for 
women in the area. RecE~iving depaItment jobs were predominantly held by males, 
while Shipping Department jobs wer€~ held exclusively by males. 
Kleer did have an internal labor market mechanism which allowed workers to 
'hid" on jobs that came open before "outsiders" were hired. This allowed experienced 
workers, primarily males, to move to the less physically demanding jr)bs in Shipping 
and Receiving. Older workers were frequently anxious to make such a change despite 
the lower pay levels in Shipping and Receiving. The operation of thp internal labor 
market caused most new pennanent employees to be hired onto the production lines. 
Another alternative for experienced production line workers, both males and females, 
was to move to semi-ski.lled jobs on the line, such as saw operator ')1' tube bender, 
which were somewhat less physically demanding than the regular production line as-
sembly jobs but still earned bonus wages. 
Kleer Windows, Inc. was not a unionized firm. In fact, the empll)yee hand book, 
which employees were required to read before they began work stated, "It is Kleer 
Window's [sic] intention to preserve and maintain a non-union status throughout the 
Company." Between my first and second summers of employment, the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters failed in a union organizing drive which generated only 
minimal interest among the employees. Throughout my employment at Kleer I could 
not locate a single worker who strongly advocated unionization. 
For most of my employment at Kleer, I was a member of the Shipping Depart-
ment, which allowed a significant amount of mobility within the shop. This mobility 
presented the opportunity to observe a total of fifteen departments (eI4?ven production 
lines; two shifts of the Shipping Department; and two shifts of the Receiving Depart-
ment) and the nature of control and resistance within those departments. 
Differences in the nature of the work task and the organization of work allow 
for comparisons across departments of the control strategies utilized under differing 
conditions. These control strategies evolved both through the intentional efl'orts of 
management (i.e., the establishment of a group production bonus) and through trial 
and error (i.e., the establishment of a productivity "rule of thumb" in the shipping de-
partment). 
PEER CONTROL IN THE KLBER 
WINDOWS PRODUCTION DEPARTMENTS 
In the Production Departments at Kleer Windows an interdependence of task 
was created through the usc of a serial production format. The production lines were 
·)rganized such that each \vorker was dependent upon workers ahead of them in the 
assembly line. \-Vorker B could not perform his task until worker A had performed her 
task. Workel- C was dependent upon B and in turn A, and so on until the end of the 
line. 
Each of the produetion lines o)Ilsisted of a "prep" area with fivt~ to ten workers 
making parts necessary for the opera.tion of the assembly lines where most crew mem-
bers perform their work. The use of the term "assembly line" tends to invoke the 
notion oftechnlcal control. However, this was not the case. Technical control rcqulres 
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that for a significant majority of the workers, the pace and ordering of the task be 
dictated by machinery or technology (Edwards 1979), Kleer Windows' assembly lines 
had no conveyor belts, or other technical apparatus, that dictated the pace of work by 
moving work object.." into and out of each worker's area. Instead, some workers would 
place work objects on carts and slide them to the next station after the cart was filled. 
Other workers were stationed along a long table. The windows and doors were slid 
into and out of each workers area by hand. While the sequence of work was 
determined by the technological organization of the workplace, the pace of work was 
not set by machinery, but by the level of effort of one's co-workers. 
Incentives to increase the pace of work were provided by the company's use of a 
group bonus system. The group bonus created an interdependence of reward, linking 
each crew member's rewards to the effort of the entire crew. A group bonus system dif-
fers from the more common piece rate systems (see Roy 1952; 1953; 1954; Whyte 1955; 
Burawoy 1979), in that the amount of the bonus earned is determined by group pro-
ductivity rather than individual perfonnance. Most studies agree that when individual 
piece rate systems are used as motivating factors, productivity is restricted to a nor~ 
mative level that is less than the capacity of the worker. In the group bonus system 
utilized at Kleer, the department received a set amount of bonus payment per .... ,rindow 
or door produced (i.e., $3.00) after reaching the required quota. With the exception of a 
few particularly complicated doors and windows, all products manufactured by the de-
partment large or small, easy or difficult to assemble paid the same amount of bonus. 
The accrued bonus is then divided evenly among all department workers present on 
that shift that day. So if a crew often workers produced fifty windows over quota they 
each earned $15.00 in production bonus for that particular shift. While there were 
weeks when departments earned $200 in bonus wages, the norm was closer to $100 
per week. The workers in these production departments had a lower base wage 
(approximately $6.00 per hour versus $7.50 per hour) than did shippers and receivers, 
however, the group bonus consistently allowed the former to earn more than the 
latter. 
The group bonus system combined with a serial production method created an 
effective system of peer control which stimulated productivity. As Clack (1967) sug-
gested, when successful completion of one's work task IS dependent upon other indi-
viduals, workers will have a tendency to monitor each other's work both in quality and 
quantity. There is much less need for dose management supervision. Workers who 
could not, or would not, maintain the pace were socially sanctioned by their co-
workers. Offending workers were excluded from break time gatherings, frequently 
verbally abused behind their hacks and to their faces, and subjected to threatened and 
actual minor physical abuse. Graffiti depicting them as homosexuals appeared on 
chalkboards in the bathroom stalls (placed there by management to di.scourage grafliti 
on permanent fixtures). This created tremendous pressure on individuals to maintain 
the hectic pace of production. Workers who did not maintain the pace set hy the group, 
often quit their jobs in a few days. Co-workers were glad to sec them go. 
A woman from the window line was complaining to a group of shippers and re-
ceivers at the time clock: 
Here I am bustin' my ass all night, while people who won·t Iwork as har·dl get paid the same money 
as I do. We haven·t made a decent bonus all week. Hell, days Iday shifl. INindow linel has one less 
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worker and puts out a hundred more windows a day! It's time we got rid of some people who won't 
work~ 
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At Kleer, as on Linhart's (1981) automobile assembly line, new employees often felt 
the wrath of more experienced co-workers making the first day on the job extremely 
stressful. New employees who couldn't "keep up" were not included in break time so-
cial gatherings and were often the main topic of conversation during such gatherings. 
There was a lot of complaining about the "new guy" on doors during break. Apparently he was only 
finishing five plates for every twenty that Dana [an experienced door line workerl finished. 
According to his complaining co-workers, the new employee told his group leader. 
~I shouldn't. have to work as fast as the others" (implying his inexperience should cause the group to 
tolerate his slower pace)." His group leader retorted, "The hell you don't!" In a few days the new 
worker quit. 
Experienced workers would also verbally attack each other if one was perceived as 
"not working hard enough." When he got "ahead" and ran out of work, a male bander 
~ the last position on the line) on a largely female production line would call out, "Come 
on, you buncha bitches!" Threats of physical harm and small but significant physical 
abuse were sometimes used to pressure co-workers who were not producing fast 
enough. On one occasion, I witnessed two crew members who perceived a third as "not 
keeping up," throwing screws at him and yelling, "Let's go!" The pain inflicted was mi-
nor, but the point was clearly made. 
In addition to pressuring co-workers to work harder, line workers also discussed 
and debated the way in which their foreman and group leaders divided the work 
among the crew. The foreman had the authority to place workers on the line wherever 
he or she saw fit. Workers' frustration was occasionally directed at foremen and group 
leaders for what was perceived to be the faulty assignment of individuals to particular 
tasks, as the following field note illustrates: 
It's that damn Denice's [door line group leader] fault we're not making any money, She always takes 
the easiest job for herself and then assigns the people she wants to talk to to work next to her. It's 
no wonder we can't make any fuckin' bonus! 
On another occasion, Terry whose wife, Dana, worked on one of the lines complained 
to his fellow shippers at break: 
They've got Dana doin' that plating job by herself. There's no way she can keep up. That's a two 
man job! If Denice would get her shit rogether and put another person on that job, they'd make some 
money, 
Burawoy (1979; 1985) and Roy (1953) compare individual piece rate systems 
with games. Roy (1953) describes workers attempting to beat the quota "for the hell of 
it" and piece work as an effective m,,~ans of passing the time at least when meeting the 
quota is a challenge. Burawoy (1979) and Shostak (1980) suggest games and horse 
play often have the effect of reducing the meaninglessness associated with factory 
work. Burawoy (1985) also argues that this type of game playing, where one attempts 
to "make out," creates consent to control, thereby legitimating the conditions wherein 
workers are exploited. 
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In the group bonus system utilized at Kleer surviving on the production lines 
was more than a game as far as workers were concerned. A game implies some degree 
of choice to participate. To be a member of a production line meant you were automat-
ically part of a group struggle for income and acceptance. This struggle was not taken 
lightly by Kleer employees. One did not win or lose alone. One failed or succeeded with 
one's co-workers (team). If a "player" did not make at least an equitable contribution 
to the group effort, the group lost income and the player lost status and acceptance 
within the group. If you contributed to "losing the game" too frequently, your team 
could make your life miserable. Making a bonus was more serious than a game. One 
did not play "for the hell of it." One played for the group's income and acceptance. 
In sum, peer control in the production lines was produced through an interde-
pendence of task, created through the serial production fonnat, and through an inter-
dependence of reward, via the group bonus system. Through the creation of these work 
structures, management provided an opportunity for the infonnal work group to pres-
sure individuals to maintain a high level of work effort. Peer control was enforced with 
sanctions such as bathroom chalkboard graffiti, verbal and physical abuse, and exclu-
sion from social groups. Peer control also resulted in pressure on supervisors to make 
job assignment decisions that allowed line workers to make the largest bonus possible. 
The influence of the informal work group effectively operated to create pressures for 
high levels of effort from individual group members. 
RESISTANCE IN THE PRODUCTION DEPARTMENTS 
Resistance in the production departments was very limited. When production 
line workers ran out of needed supplies during the shift, it was common for them to 
run to the rear of the building to the supply "cage" to get the needed item and to run 
back to their work station. This was a perfect opportunity for social loafing that was 
rarely capitalized upon. Foremen and co-workers were not ordering the workers to lit-
erally run for supplies. There were even company regulations against running inside 
the plant. Nonetheless, workers often ran so as to minimize time away from actual 
production. 
Bonuses and quotas were based on time studies conducted by management. 1 
witnessed several time studies during my third summer of employment. While other 
researchers (i.e., Balzer 1976) have found workers engaging in systematic slowdowns 
while being observed by time study officials, 1 could not detect such resistance. I asked 
the workers being studied if they sped up or slowed down when being observed. The 
consistent reply was, "You just work at a steady pace. Like nonna!. Don't go too fast or 
too slow." But in practice the "normal" pace for line workers was as fast as they could 
possibly work. 
Despite the general acceptance of the fast pace of production, when there was 
little possibility of earning bonus money production workers engaged in systematic 
slowdowns. Break time conversations were dominated by workers complaining about 
the situation. "I ain't gonna bust my ass for noihin!" was the usual sentiment. 
Frustration was often directed at the other shift. who always did "the good runs and 
left the shit for us." 
Peer control on the production lines proved to be highly effective at maintaining 
high levels of productivity. The routinization of the work tasks into an assembly line 
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fonnat and the accompanying physical immobility of workers contributed to peer con-
trol. The routinization of t.asks meant that work productivity was easily measurable. A 
worker who was not "keeping up" could readily be identified by his or her foreman, 
and even more importantly by co-workers. The lack of mobility kept workers at their 
work stations, where they could be observed by co-workers who maintained an active 
interest in their productivity levels. These factors contributed to low levels of resis-
tance to management and high levels of productivity on the productiof'. lines. Workers 
effectively pressured each other, and, as noted above, even their supervisors, into in-
creased productivity when they could earn a group bonus because of tr.eir dependence 
upon one another for the bonus and for completion of their work tasks. 
PEER CONTROL IN THE: KLEER SHIPPING DEPARTMENT 
In the shipping department there was no means of earning a production bonus. 
Despite that fact, peer control did exist, although with somewhat different results in 
tenus of productivity. One reason for the differences was the inability of the company 
to effectively routinize the work tasks of the shipping department to make measure-
ment of productivity easy and unambiguous. This made resistance to control relatively 
easy to hide from upper management. Yet, the shippers themselves monitored and 
sanctioned each other's work productivity. 
The primary task of shippers was to locate finished product in the warehouse 
areas of the shop, bring it to the loading docks via forklift, and then manually load the 
correct number of each type of door or window ordered into company trucks for deliv-
ery the next day. Shippers were usually paired off into "teams," making each shipper 
dependent upon his partner for the completion of the assigned load. 
Factors such as (1) the organization, or more appropriately the lack thereof, of 
the warehouse areas of the shop; (2) the difficulty in detennining whether a particular 
order had been complet€·d by the production lines; (3) the necessity of shuffiing stock 
racks in the limited space of the warehouse areas; and (4) the uniqueness of each load 
made measuring productivity a very ambiguous process. This difficulty led Kleer 
management to develop a "rule of thumb" regarding the number of trucks that should 
be loaded each shift" 
The necessity of completing a certain number of "loads" each shift and the team 
loading format created an interdependence of task within the shipping department. In 
order for the departmem, to reach its expected level of productivity, all shippers had to 
be contributing to the group's output. Shippers were therefore, not only dependent 
upon their partner, but also on all other shippers to complete the group work task. A 
reallocation rule, whereby shippers who finished loading one truck were reassigned to 
help those shippers not yet finished" created an interdependence of mward. If shipper 
A was not making an equitable contribution to the group's productivity, that meant 
shippers Band C had to contribute even more effort without any corresponding in-
crease in reward. 
The combination of the "team" loading structure, the "rule of thumb" productiv-
ity expectation, and the reallocation rule contributed to a system of peer control that 
led to a level of productivity within a peer defined range. Shipping crew memhers 
sought to ensure that I~veryone did "their share" of work. Workers who were seen 
"standing around" were: taunted by crew members with cries of "Prebreak [meaning 
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the offending party was taking his break before the official break period]! If you ain't 
got nothin' to do, come help me!" Workers who continually were away from their work 
area on infonnal breaks, were paged by other workers on the public address system. 
"Jay Howard report to your work area," was considered an especially harsh insult be-
cause it implied for the entire shop to hear, that the offending party was not pulling 
his "share" of the load in the crew. As Balzer (976) found at Western Electric, dissen-
sion within the workgroup was caused by feelings you were "carrying other people." 
The timing of infonnal breaks was important. Other crew members were toler-
ant of them, providing the worker had contributed his "fair share" to the day's loading. 
This meant that, in general, breaks early in the day were frowned upon because it was 
not yet apparent that the worker had made his required contribution to the group ef· 
fort. Co-workers were more tolerant of informal breaks after lunch when a shipper's 
contribution was evident. As with the production line workers, offending shippers 
were likely to find their name included in obscene graffiti on restroom chalkboards. 
Crew members were clearly interested in monitoring the work productivity of 
each other. My first day at Kleer Windows, I was assigned to work with Bruce. Bruce 
was to "train" me to load trucks while he also serviced the lines. Bruce was constantly 
in and out of the trailer giving me little or no advice as to what I should be doing while 
he was gone. Often I was left in the trailer with nothing to do, worrying about the rest 
of the crew's developing opinions regarding me. The first time Bruce wandered away 
leaving me in the trailer to load by myself, Rob [shipping foreman] came in and said, 
"Hey Jay, don't let Bruce make you do all the loading." I heard the same comment 
from each of the other three crew members at various points throughout the shift. I 
initially attributed this concern to Bruce's tendency toward social loafing. However, I 
soon discovered workers, in general, closely monitored the effort of one another. 
The day I began my third summer of work at Kleer, which was my first on the 
day shift, I had a very similar experience. I was assigned to load a semi with Nick, the 
group leader. I was loading, and sweating profusely, in the trailer while Nick was 
using the forklift to gather the next rack to be loaded. Stu came into the trailer: 
Doncha let Nick make you do all the loadin' while he rides around on the forklift. Ya got to watch 
that asshole or he'll have you doin' all the fuckin' work! 
[Later in the day,] I finished loading a rack into the trailer by myself, while Nick was 
again out on the forklift. I walked acrOss the dock looking for something to do. I spot-
ted Roy unloading a rack into a trailer by himself. I went inside and began helping 
him. Roy greeted me with: 
"Wbatsa matter, Nick got you doin' all the work?" "Oh, he's all right," I responded, not wanting to 
appear to be a "whiner" on my first day. ""Hey man, don't let the motha fucka leave all the loadin' for 
you tJJ do." 
In a few minutes, Nick returned. When he discovered me helping Roy, he said to me 
(loud enough for Roy to hear), "You helpin' that weakling? Let him do his own work!" 
These experiences alerted me to crew members' monitoring of one another to ensure 
an equitable division of the crew's work. 
Nick's reaction to my assisting Roy illustrates both his concern with Roy's con-
tribution to the group's productivity and one of the ways shippers attempted to "goad" 
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each other on to higher levels of productivity. As in the case of the bathroom graffiti, 
"deviant" co-workers often found their masculinity challenged. The most common of 
these ritual insults were anti-female in nature, as male co-workers were called "bitch," 
"slut," and "pussy,"2 Shippers also gave one another derogatory nicknames which 
would be used when a worker was not performing up to the crew's st.andard. Jim, a 
driver who helped load in shop occasionally, became "Dr. Dolittle - and that's not just 
cuz he talks to them gophers! [Jim frequently fed potato chips to gophers during break 
time.]" Gene was "Bugger." I was occasionally called, "College Boy" or "Lil' Buddy." 
Often these nicknames would take the form of associating an individual with 
another shipper, who was. considered a "bad" worker. Nick, the first shift group leader, 
became "Miller [the shipping foreman] Junior - just stands around doin' nothin', 
while tellin' everybody else to get to work." Terry frequently heard, "G.J." for "Gene 
.Junior." When I started on the first shift, after two summers on the second, Nick fre· 
quently called me, "Terry," referring to the second shift group leader who was fired for 
walking off the job after getting into an argument with Gene between my second and 
third summers of work. I retaliated by calling Nick, "Bruce," a fanner shipper who had 
worked on both shifts before transferring to Receiving. The "bad" worker with which 
one was associated varied frequently. Anyone, including those who usually were the 
most productive workers, could be the "bad" worker if they had not been producing up 
to the group's norms that day. 
About five minutes before quitting time, LaITY and I finil:lhed loading a semi. We walked past Nick 
on our way to the bathrooms to wash. Nick called to LaITY: 
~Hey, pick up those dooI'13 leaning against the post and wss 'em in the singles rack. wm ya?" Larry 
responded, "Let 'nights' lake care of ' em: 
"O.K Roy," Nick retorted to Larry. Larr)' turned around, picked up the doors, and put them in the 
rack. Nick looked at me and grinned. 
By linking Larry with a "bad" worker, in this case Roy, Nick took advantage of 
Larry's desire to maintain status within the group, Larry's concenl for the group's 
opinion of him was Significant enough for him to reconsider and comply with Nick's di-
rective. As Shostak (1980) has noted, peer acceptance is of high importance to many 
employees. It is a need that is second only to wages for many workers. 
Teasing co-workers about loading errors was an effective means of quality con-
trol in the Shipping Department. Making a loading error also meant risking loss of 
status within the group. Truck drivers enjoyed the opportunity to publicly announce 
loading errors they discovered when making deliveries: 
There's those two assho'les who fucked up lIly truck, IMack shouted at Mike and me as he entered 
the building. I Cain't you guys get your shit right? You guys gave me 8 grays and 16 dark windows, 
when I needed 12 of each. You also got the wrong 45 by 12's! I need front solids and you loaded front 
sliders~ You're s'posed tn be double checKing each other, ya know! 
Such public proclamations were common and there was little shippers could say 
in self defense. Loading errors and minor mishaps while driving the forklifts were 
regularly brought to group attention for public ridicule thus creating peer pressure to 
avoid mistakes. 
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RESTRICTING PRODUCTIVITY IN THE SHIPPING DEPARTMENT 
Despite the peer produced pressure to maintain an equitable level ofwark effort 
in the shipping department, resistance to control was a frequent occurrence. "Inten-
tionally restricting production; [or] encouraging others to restrict production. was 
defined as a serious infraction of company policy according to the Kleer Windows 
Employee Handbook. Violation of this rule was officially" ... considered cause for dis-
charge on the first time." Yet, shippers, and occasionally their foremen and group 
leaders, made it a frequent practice to limit their own productivity and to attempt to 
limit the productivity of other shippers. In research this is the more commonly found 
impact of the informal work group on productivity (i.e., Roy 1952; Roethlisberger and 
Dickson 1956). The pressure to limit productivity was felt when particular shippers 
began to produce "too much." To produce too much could lead to an increase in man-
agement's "rule of thumb" for productivity in the department without a corresponding 
increase in pay. At that point the payoff of work effort to level of reward would be de-
creased for shippers. 
Each summer when I began working, I was repeatedly told by other shippers, 
group leaders, and even foremen, "Take it easy." "We want to make this [particular 
work task assignmentJ last until lunch. Stretch it ouL" "Pace yourself." "We ain't in no 
hurry." "There's no need to set any land speed records." These admonitions were in-
tended to teach me informally not to exceed the group's norms of productivity. 
On several occasions, after being told to "slow down," I intentionally kept 
working at the same pace in order to test my co-workers' reactions. The following field 
note illustrates a typical response to my deviant levels of productivity. 
Stu and I were loading a semi at one of the bays outside the building. It was a hot day, 85 
degrees out.side the trailer, ea1;ily 100 degrees inside. Stu was driving the forklift and directing the 
load. I was assisting him. After setting the rack of product inside the truck, Stu would return to his 
water bottle, which sat on the forklift, for a drink and a short "break." Each time he would say to 
me, "There's no need to be in no hUlTY. Take it easy:' I would nod brieny and keep loading. Stu 
would watch me for a few moments and then re::mme helping me load the product in the trailer. 
After this scene was repeated several times, Stu picked up his water bottle off the forkJjfl, 
walked over to where r was loading and sat down on a stack of boxes. This effectively stopped me 
from loading until he got up, because he was sitting right where I needed to load more boxes, 
Later, after we finished loading a rack, Stu wok the empty rack out of the truck with the 
forklift. Instead of picking up the next rack to be loaded and placing it in the truck, he said, ''I'm 
going to fill my water bottle. Take a break." He then drove off, leaving me standing in the trailer 
with nothing to load and no way to bring anyt.hing else to load into the trailer. He had once again 
effectively stopped my deviant productivity. 
In general. shippers could limit the productivity of co-workers by monopolizing 
the forklift. The norm was that the senior worker had the choice of whether to drive 
the forklift himself or let the less experienced shipper drive. By assuming the role of 
the driver, the shipper could more easily control the pace of work. 
"Story telling" was another means of limiting a co-worker's productivity. Co-
workers, occasionally including group leaders, would shut off the forklift so their 
partner could hear them talk about whatever topic was on their mind. The "helper" 
was restricted in his ability to engage in productive work until the driver was finished 
relating his story. 
In sum, an interdependence of task was created in the Shipping Department 
through the team loading format and management's "rule of thumb" for productivity, 
PEER CONTROL IN THE INDUSTRIAL WORKPLACE 251 
An interdependence of reward was created through the use of a reallocation rule. 
Together these factors led to a system of peer control that produced a level of produc-
tivity within a peer controlled range. Obviously, management played a role in defining 
the acceptable level of productivity by establishing the informal "rule of thumb," but 
shippers resisted all attempts to increase the expected level of productivity through 
their infonnal sanctioning of one another. Shippers sought to ensure each crew mem-
ber contributed an equitable share to the group's expected productivity. At the same 
time shippers also attempted to ensure no shipper produced too mueh, which could 
lead to an increase in the expected productivity level without a corresponding increase 
in reward. 
CONTROL AND RESISTENCE IN 
THE KLEER RE;CIEVING DEPARTMENT 
The individualized nature of work tasks was the most important variable in 
shaping control and resistance in the receiving department. With the exception of the 
two first shift receivers whose primary responsibility was to unload delivery trucks as 
they arrived, each of the receivers had unique job responsibilities which, in practice, 
did not overlap with the responsibilities of any other receiver. Each of the four "glass 
pullers" were responsible for supplying glass to particular production lines. Each had 
particular storage areas for "his" glass which were segregated from other pullers' 
glass. One receiver ran the supply "cage" during the first shift. Another did the same 
on the second shift. This position's primary responsibility was to place delivered sup-
plies and tools into stock, and, when necessary, assisting production line workers in 
locating those supplies. Two other receivers were "metal men." Their job was to keep 
certain production lines supplied with metal for making door and window frames. 
Because each receiver had his or her own uniquely defined job responsibilities, 
rather than a shared work task, as in shipping, or a serial production line, as in the 
production departments, they had much less interest in monitoring and controlling 
each others' productivity. Receivers were not, to any significant degree, dependent 
upon each other to perform their work task. Therefore, it did not matter whether an-
other receiver got his or her job done. The rest of the crew was not dependent upon 
them for completion of their individualized work tasks. 
In Receiving, as in Shipping, no group bonus was available. Receivers were paid 
a straight hourly wage with no opportunity to increase their income by individually or 
corporately increasing their effort. Therefore, there was no interdependence of reward 
as well as no interdependence of task. 
Officially, according to Miller (who had been the Shipping foreman, but was 
transferred to Receiving as foreman during my third summer of employment), the de-
partment had a reallocation rule. Receivers were supposed to assist each other if they 
finished their work ahead of time In practice, such assistance virtually never oc-
curred. Randy, one of t.he metal men, often complained that the other receivers, in 
particular Bruce (a glass puller), never came to assist him, despite their official obliga-
tion to do so. 
Bruce is supposed to come help me when he's done pullin' glass, but the lazy motha fuck.a never 
does~ They all stretch it Itheir individually assigned work. tasks I out HO they don't hafta help. Even 
when they do get done, t.hey stand around in back and bullHhit, while I'm up here bustin' my ass. 
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As long as receivers kept the production lines stocked with needed materials 
(i.e., glass, metal), production line foremen seemed unconcerned with what receivers 
did during their spare time. Relations with production foremen were generally quite 
relaxed and friendly. Foremen would page receivers if problems: arose. Receivers were 
quick to respond and cultivate good relations with the lilll~ foremen. Production fore-
men would even join receivers during their informal breaks, "standing around" behind 
the building and smoking or drinking coffee during working hours. 
The only person who showed any concern with reeeive,rs who didn't seem to 
have much to do was their new foreman, Denny Miller. The previous foreman, Dan, 
had non-receiving responsibilities which kept him in the front offices most of the day. 
Dan pretty much left receivers on their own. If he didn't g4?t any complaints from the 
line foremen, he assumed the job was being done satisfactorily. If Denny, on the other 
hand, discovered receivers standing around, he would, as hiB crew put it, "invent 
work" for them. Quite often this meant rearranging stocked supplies to make them 
more accessible or to merely appear more orderly. At other times it meant being sent 
outside the shop to "clean up" the old semi trailer used for storing surplus and obsolete 
stock or to stack old glass crates which were to be returned to the supplJier. In order to 
avoid being given such tasks, receivers made it a practice to "look busy" Iby engaging in 
impression management (see Molstad 1988) when Denny came around. 
Becaus~~ receivers primarily worked alone and because of their need to move 
throughout the building and between buildings, they were subjected to relatively little 
monitoring by either supervisors or co-workers. Receivers spent a considerable amount 
of time sociali:cing in warehouse areas of the building, which werl~ not readily visible to 
other employees. The supply cage was a popular gathering spot, since if their super-
visor happened along one could pretend to be there to pick up some necessary 
supplies. Pete, who operated the cage during day shift, infonned me, "Standing around 
and talking is one of our favorite pastimes." Linda, who ran ti',le cage on the second 
shift, frequently could be found reading a novel and drinking a 80ft drink in the cage. 
On those occasions when she got tired of hearing production workers complain to her 
about this practic4~, she would move to a back room in the cage where she was out 
of sight, but could hear if anyone came into the cage. During my second summer of 
employment, Linda averaged one and a half hours of reading, two Of' three nights 
each week. 
In sum, attempts at control were largely ineffective in the receiving depart-
ment. Receivers tended to work at the minimum level necessary to avoid. friction with 
their supervisor or line foremen. Their work tasks were indlividualized instead of in-
terdependent. Because the reallocation rule was routinely igJ'lored, there was no inter-
dependence of reward. Instead, receivers attempted to "stretch out" their assigned 
work task to make it consume the entire shift whenever possible. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Control in the workplace is an expression of the larger ph.enomenon of social 
control - the various means used by groups within society to bring its: recalcitrant 
members back into line (Berger 1963). Societies utilize a number of control mecha-
nisms, such as physical violence, economic pressures (i.e., threats to one's livelihood), 
persuasion, ridicule and gossip, social ostracism, morality, C\llstoms and marmers, and 
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the influence of intimates - family and friends. Underneath this pressure toward 
cunfonnity is a profound desire to be accepted. Identity is not "given" by virtue of being 
born human. It is bestowed in acts of social recognition. The self is constructed 
through interaction with other humans (see Mead 1974; Cooley 1902; Berger and 
Luckmann 1967). In a sense, we become that as we are addressed (Berger 1963). The 
groups to which we belong provide significant feedback which the individual uses in 
formulating a sense of idt~ntity. The individual faces tremendous pressures toward 
conformity in order to maintain a positive sense of self. 
When considering the workplace, there is a tendency to think of control systems 
a.s being originated by forces outside of the group whose members are subjected to con· 
trol (i.e., Edwards 1979). However, because individuals acquire a self through interac· 
tion with others, the groups to which an individual belongs can potentially be a signif-
icant agent of control. Under certain conditions the group can serve to control the be-
havior of its individual mE~mbers. In the workplace, management can potentially har-
ness the influence of the work group so that workers themselves actively seek to moni-
tor and increase the productivity of their co-workers. The concept of peer control rec-
ognizes the influence of sodal factors in production and the managerial desire to bring 
these factors under their control. To what degree did the management at Kleer Win-
dows intentionally create a system of peer control? I never raised that issue in my 
discussions with management representatives because of fears that it could have ad-
verse effects on my co-workers. To raise the issue would have had the effect of making 
it more salient to management and potentially result in an intensification of work for 
employees. However, based on Kleer management's patchwork and continuously 
evolving approach to dealing with worker problems, I believe management stumbled 
into a system of peer control that was effective on the production lines through a pro-
cess of trial and error. I do not believe management fully understands why the system 
is effective. Rather, management takes an "if it works, don't fix it" approach to worker 
controL 
Nonetheless, at Kleer Windows, as in the workplace in general, there are in-
tentional attempts to control the individual members of the organization. There is an 
ongoing struggle on the part of management and the various groups of workers to es-
tablish a dominant definition of reality, that includes such notions as "a fair day's ef-
fort" and the "good worker." Management's desire is to maximize workers' level of ef-
fort. This goal may be pursued through the use of peer control, whether or not man-
agement understands the intricacies of the system. Peer control exists when co-
workers actively seek to monitor and influence the productivity level of individual 
work group members. Peer control may operate to limit or stimulate the productivity 
of individual workers. Interdependence of task, making workers dependent upon each 
other for the completion of their work task, is one factor that contributes to the 
establishment of peer control that pressures co-workers to increase or maintain high 
lE'vels of productivity. Could peer control exist without an interdependence of task? 
Conceivably it could. However, explicitly linking performers with their performance 
has been shown to reduce social loafing (Jackson and Padgett 1982; Kerr and Brunn 
1981; Williams, Harkins and Latane 1981; Latane, Williams and Harkins 1979), By 
making work tasks interdependent, workers are better able to detennine who is, and 
who is not, maintaining the group's desired productivity level. 
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The second condition necessary for peer control wherein pressure is created for 
high levels of productivity is an interdependence of reward whereby the rewards of 
each individual worker are dependent upon both individual effort and the effort of the 
work group. This creates motivation for workers to monitor each other's productivity. 
In the production departments this was created through a group bonus system. One 
reason for the effectiveness of this system in the production departments was the lack 
of "rate cutting" at KJeer. I could find no worker who could recall the quota for bonus 
being raised, except when more workers were added to the particular production line. 
All windows and all doors manufactured by a particular line paid the same bonus rate 
regardless of size or difficulty to manufacture. Overt "rate cutting" by Kleer manage-
ment would likely have severed workers' perception of the link between levels of effort 
and financial reward. Had there been a history of "rate cutting" at KIeer it is likely 
that peer control would have been less successful, 
AB this analysis implies interdependence of task and interdependence of reward 
are the most significant factors contributing to management's ability to harness the 
influence of the informal work group to increase productivity. However other condi-
tions are also necessary, but not sufficient, for peer control. Visibility of co-workers, 
the measurability of productivity, and the openness of the work process to peer 
influenced productivity increases are some of these factors, 
Peer control has a number of similarities and contrasts with the Japanese 
model of organization. For example, involved workers are the key to increased produc-
tivity in peer control as well as in Ouchi's (1981) Theory Z. Japanese management 
practices have often emphasized devotion to the firm. Ouchi argues it is the task of 
management to coordinate individual efforts in a productive manner while giving em-
ployees incentives to take a cooperative, long range view. However, the incentives pro-
vided at KIeer Windows stressed short range goals, namely maximizing that day's 
production bonus. While the usual company as "team" or "family" appeals were made 
in meetings and in written form, workers scoffed at the idea. Nonetheless, KIeer pro-
duction workers maintained very high levels of work effort without developing signifi-
cant "loyalties" to the company. 
In both Theory Z and Friedman's (1977) "responsible autonomy," the element of 
"trust" is stressed as a major factor in productivity. In the system of peer control that 
evolved at KIeer, trust was not necessary for the successful operation of the control 
system. In peer control, management doesn't "trust" workers to perform to the best of 
their abilities. Nor does management concede elements of control so that individual 
workers may use their discretion in the process of production, as Friedman suggests. 
Instead management relies on co-workers, or the work group, to ensure each individu-
al's productivity. 
Ouchi (1981) also suggests that another important lesson of Theory Z is sub-
tlety. By this he means management needs to use and recognize the personalities, 
strengths and weaknesses of individuals in coordinating production. Management By 
Stress (MBS) (Parker and Slaughter 1988) also recognizes management attempts to 
utilize the workers' sense of observation. Peer control, too, stresses this subtle recog-
nition of individual differences. However, instead of relying on management to develop 
this capacity, co-workers' knowledge of one another's strengths and weaknesses was 
utilized. For example, production workers pressured their foremen to assign work 
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tasks in such a manner that best utilized individual skills in the drive for higher pro-
ductivity. 
Parker and Slaughter's (1988) analysis of the "Management By Stress" system 
has some addibional parallels with the operation of peer control. In the MBS system 
stress serves as the force that drives and regulates the producti.on system. 
Management stresses the production system to reveal weaknesses in a number of 
ways: increasing line speed; cutting the number of people or machines; or, assigning 
workers additional tasks. The MBS system assumes that pressure is the best way to 
motivate workers. The pressure is allowed to fall onto production workers, team lead-
ers, and lowest level management by making them solve the problem. 
At Kleer Windows eo-workers were the most significant source of pressure to 
maint.ain high llevels of work effort. It was not one's supervisor, but one's peers that 
communicated one's shortcomings and successes. In the MBS system, peer pressures 
against absenteeism and "working in the hole" exist, but the E-\)UrCI~ of pressure is most 
clearly management's attempts to stress the system. The key distinction between peer 
control and these .Japanese organizational strategies is the reliance on co-workers to 
perform management's task of controlling individual workers. All control systems, 
including peer control, are in constant need of confirmation and recon:lirmation by 
those they are meant to control. While people need recognition withi.n society so as to 
have an image of self, society needs the recognition of many in order to exist at all 
(Berger 1963). Individuals can attempt to resist social controll by refusing to recognize 
a particular soeial reality, by withdrawing from it, or by manipulating social struc·· 
tures in unforeseen ways (Berger 1963). If the individual can find others who will join 
in acts of resistance to social control, a counterculture is cre2lted. This group can then 
maintain "deviant" identities and meanings in the face of social pressures. While social 
control is a powerful force., it is not beyond resistance, particularly in the context of a 
deviant group. 
NOTES 
1. Kleer Windows is a Iktitious namc, a~ are the names of the Klecr employees mentioned herein. 
2. Female Kleer Employees used the same set. of anti-female dcrogatory term!; in reference to each other as 
did the male employee:;. The purpose of the inf;ult.<; were thc same as well, t.o in!:lult or "goad" the offending 
co-worker toward higher levels of productivity. Occasionally female emplo.'Iees would get into heated argu· 
ments, exchanging insults over the sUPPof;ed spread of malicious gossip by onc wOl"ker about another. In 
general, among Kleer employt"es, to lw feminine was to be slandered as inferior. 
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